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In the 1956 science fiction film Forbidden Planet, a dashing crew of 
terrestrial soldiers frees a fair maiden and destroys an alien machine 
that can unleash the destructive power of the “id.” Leslie Nielsen, 
playing the captain of the United Planets Cruiser C57-D, triumphs over 
the hubristic mad genius Dr. Morbius by forcing him to accept that the 
invisible monster that killed all members of his original expeditionary 
force was a materialization of his own “subconscious.” Morbius, played 
by Walter Pidgeon, has been living with his daughter Alta in a 
modernist, biomorphic-style ranch house in a state of radical seclusion 
and incestuous self-sufficiency. Psychoanalytic terms like “id” were 
common currency in Hollywood of the 1950s: long before 1970s film 
theorists embraced sexual difference, the gaze, and fetishism as keys to 
understanding film form, spectatorship, and the ideological apparatus, 
the American film industry followed in the footsteps of Greenwich 
Village bohemian modernists by taking up the tools presented by 
Sigmund Freud’s epochal discovery.
In narrativizing, visualizing, and taking apart the psychic apparatus 
on screen, Hollywood filmmakers and stars displayed their embrace of 
modern life: Forbidden Planet not only cast the psychoanalytic concept 
of the “id” as its villain, it was also the first feature film with a completely 
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electronic score, composed by experimental musicians Lois and Bebe 
Baron. Dr. Morbius’ home on Altair bears a striking resemblance to the 
intimate but modern case-study homes being built in California by a 
generation of idealistic architects, from Charles and Ray Eames to 
Gregory Ain. Its furnishings follow the biomorphic designs of Isamu 
Noguchi, while Robbie the Robot as futuristic butler incarnates the 
domestic labor-saving device in one compact, queer anthropomorphic 
package. Finally, under Leslie Nielsen’s, or Commander John Jay 
Adams’, insistence, Morbius acknowledges, like a good psychoanalytic 
patient, his dark side: he accepts that the monster is a materialization 
of his unconscious aggression. In order to save the world from its 
nefarious power, he, like the Krell technology, must be destroyed. The 
massive power plant, suggested by special effects produced by painted 
sets – implying a vast underground lair – must be laid waste, lest other 
creatures come into contact with its mysterious ability to realize one’s 
unconscious aggressions. His daughter Alta is released from her 
incestuous sequestration and the expeditionary force can return to 
Earth having solved the riddle of Morbius’ failure and self-destruction. 
The unconscious, once weaponized, can have genocidal powers: its 
containment is the task of a rag-tag detachment of Earth soldiers, 
whose respect for the chain of command allows the highest-ranking 
officer to win the love of the innocent daughter of an alien world. 
Working between high culture and pulp fiction, the film is able to refer 
to Shakespeare and Freud while providing an MGM showcase for 
Disney animators, on loan to render the monster materialized out of 
Morbius’ unconscious.
According to Ann Douglas, Freud’s career and body of work shared 
a “mind-set and a mood” with white urban America: “Freud and 
America in the modern era were not just conversationalists on a 
common theme, but mutual mind readers at work in an age fasci-
nated with all forms of mind reading and mental telepathy. … As 
powerful arrivistes, Freud and America, more specifically New York , 
shared in its most acute form of adrenaline rush that was modernism” 
(1995, 156). Douglas’ analysis of American culture of the 1920s 
weaves narrative strands that tie together the cultural restlessness 
and spirit of experimentation and invention that characterized New 
York and its bohemian culture. William James and Gertrude Stein, 
two forward-thinking Americans, emerge in her history as figures 
that were fascinated and repelled by psychoanalysis. Douglas describes 
Freud as fundamentally hostile to the energies of the young nation 
but his ambitions for psychoanalysis as a set of world-making and 
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 world-destroying insights inspired Greenwich Village bohemians, 
aspiring actresses, and men of letters. The power of his discovery of 
the unconscious was allegorized in Forbidden Planet by the Krell 
machine. If, according to psychoanalytic theory, resistance was the 
hallmark by which its proponents and adversaries measured its truth, 
the enthusiasm with which psychoanalytic theory was embraced in 
America was deeply disturbing to its founder. Popular culture as it 
emerged in the 1920s and 1930s had already taken up many of Freud’s 
theories and presented them energetically in the film industry, with 
daring young women like movie star Colleen Moore seen reading a 
book by Freud in Flaming Youth (1923) (Douglas 1995, 123). In a 
letter dating from May 14, 1922, to Arthur Schnitzler, Freud writes 
upon the occasion of the playwright’s birthday that Schnitzler had 
made similar discoveries in human psychology as psychoanalysis, but 
that he found aesthetically pleasing forms with which to communi-
cate his insights. Apologetically, Freud closes the letter with the state-
ment, “Forgive me for drifting into psychoanalysis; I simply can’t do 
anything else. I know, however, that psychoanalysis is not the means 
of making oneself popular” (quoted in Jones 1957, 444).
In fact, MGM, the studio that produced Forbidden Planet, was an early 
adopter when it came to psychoanalysis: readers of the New York Times 
on January 24, 1925, would have found themselves scrutinizing the 
following headline, “Freud Rebuffs Goldwyn: Viennese Psychoanalyst 
Is Not Interested in Motion Picture Offer.” According to the New York 
Times report, Goldwyn travelled to Vienna to ask the “master” of 
psychoanalysis to write a love story, but Freud refused even to meet 
with him. For Douglas, Freud’s rejection of Goldwyn’s offer was of a 
piece with his symptomatic dislike of American life and its popular 
culture: she implies that Freud’s animus lay in the “hatred of small 
differences” that motivates narcissistic rejection of those who remind 
us too much of ourselves.
Freud and the American moderns like William James did diverge in 
their attitudes toward religion and the mind-cure therapies that 
emerged at the turn of the century in the United States. For Ann 
Douglas, James’ acceptance of the practices and results of spiritualism 
and its exploration of the occult and the supernatural was linked to 
pragmatism’s emphasis on practice rather than theory: in practice, 
mind-cure therapy was producing powerful healing effects on its 
patients, just as spiritualism gave succor to those who craved contact 
with other worlds and their lost ones. Christian Science, as pioneered 
by Mary Baker Eddy, was a female-oriented movement. James did not 
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hesitate to affirm “alternative” cures and alternative knowledge pro-
duced by ordinary, often uneducated women. James rejected Old 
Testament austerity and the Calvinist approach to salvation, while 
Freud’s patriarchal authoritarianism placed him in a starkly drawn 
genealogical relationship with impersonality and masculinist privileging 
of objectivity.
Like psychoanalysis, mind-cure and self-help were based upon the 
idea that unseen, non-organic forces shape our world and our bodies. 
Perhaps these movements faced a medical establishment bent on 
enforcing a monopoly on expertise in the healing arts, but psychoanal-
ysis appeared exotic and foreign while self-help and mind-cure were 
allied to American traditions and folk cures. While compelling, Douglas’ 
parsing of the difference between William James and Gertrude Stein, 
on the one hand, and Sigmund Freud, on the other, overlooks a pow-
erful dimension of Freudian theory – its intimate relationship with the 
deflationary and comical worldview of Yiddish folk humor. In fact, 
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905) anthologizes the Jewish 
joke and its folk repository of popular wisdom. Freud allows us to 
interpret its humor as playful, infantile subversion of the pretensions 
of the powerful and the wealthy, even as he demonstrates that, as in 
the experiences of Jewish popular culture with its unflinching take on 
the vanity of the rich, the desire of the undesirable offers powerful 
examples of the power of censorship and the pleasure of nonsensical 
defiance. Freud’s explanations of the economy of repression and its 
relationship to laughter can be crudely summarized in this way: a good 
joke allows teller and listener to save energy that we spend censoring 
childish associations between words (puns), aggression against the 
superego (displacement, nonsense, criticism), and sexual associations 
(dirty jokes, of which there are not many examples in the joke book). 
He returned over and over again to the following “Jewish joke,” which 
he felt demonstrated the shared pleasure that jokes communicate 
when they present the cleverness of instinctual life defending itself 
from superegoic reproach:
An impoverished individual borrowed 25 florins from a prosperous 
acquaintance, with many asservations of his necessitous circumstances. 
The very same day his benefactor met him again in a restaurant with a 
plate of salmon mayonnaise in front of him. The benefactor reproached 
him, “What? You borrow money from me and then order yourself 
salmon mayonnaise? Is that what you’ve used my money for?” “I don’t 
understand you,” replied the object of the attack; “if I don’t have any 
Catherine Liu
220
money I can’t eat salmon mayonnaise, and if I have some money I am not 
allowed to eat salmon mayonnaise. Well, then, when am I to eat salmon 
mayonnaise?” 
(Freud 1953–74, 8:49–50; translation modified)
Jewish humor embodies a subaltern people’s comic vision of human 
vanity and social and economic inequity. In this joke, the hedonism of 
the poor man and his willful misunderstanding of his benefactor’s 
reproach allow us to see philanthropy or the generosity of the rich for 
what it is – an exercise of power and discipline. We sympathize with 
the poor man’s self-defense and trickery and laugh at the benefactor’s 
hypocrisy exposed: his gift came with strings attached. A sob story and 
the pity evoked demonstrate that when the rich give to the poor, they 
do not want the poor to enjoy the good things of life. The connection 
between this Jewish joke and Freud’s deflationary but comic view of 
human pretension is obscured in Douglas’ otherwise magisterial 
account of his influence on American moderns. When she reduces 
Freud’s interpretation of jokes to sinister vehicles for repressed vio-
lence, she is taking a cue from the melodramatic plot of popular 
understanding of the id as promoted by Forbidden Planet (Douglas 
1995, 139).
Freud was without a doubt, if not an Old Testament, then an Old 
World patriarch, but Ann Douglas in 1995, and then David Cronenberg 
in his 2011 film A Dangerous Method represent him as particularly 
humorless and severe. Viggo Mortensen’s Freud is an ethically upright, 
judgmental and brilliant man. For Douglas, Freud is a dynamic upstart. 
Cronenberg and Douglas perform similar acts of decontextualization 
by ignoring “Jewish sensibility” formed by Yiddish and its earthiness 
and stubborn plebeian pride (Gabler 2011, 10). Freud’s book on jokes 
abounds with characters familiar to popular Yiddish culture: opportu-
nistic schädchen, or matchmakers, desperate bachelors, Jewish beggars, 
Jewish millionaires, superstitious faithful and the deceitful rabbis who 
exploit them. As Freud describes the pleasure released when joke teller 
and interlocutor can share in the temporary lifting of repression, he 
cites the Jewish jokes and puns with which he is familiar. The comedy 
of unmasking “arises in the first instance as an unintended discovery 
derived from human social relations” (Freud 1953–74, 8:189). Neal 
Gabler and Harvey Pekar would agree. As Gabler concludes in his 
introduction to Pekar’s illustrated volume on Yiddishkeit, Yiddish is 
capable of ripping “through formalities … prevarications – pretensions, 
and … dishonesty. In a world that fetishizes money and status, 
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Yiddishkeit shrugs at both” (Gabler 2011, 10). In the case of the joke 
about salmon mayonnaise, we laugh because we are given temporary 
reprieve from an oppressive and disciplining sense of gratitude enforced 
by the generosity of the powerful. In Freud’s Civilization and Its 
Discontents, he casts a shadow of a doubt on his friend Romain Rolland’s 
description of a spiritually infused “oceanic feeling of connectedness” 
with the shrug of Yiddishkeit’s vernacular skepticism:
So it is a feeling of indissoluble connection, of belonging inseparably to 
the external world as a whole. To me, personally, I may remark, this 
seems something more in the nature of an intellectual judgment, not, it 
is true, without any accompanying feeling-tone, but with one of a kind 
which characterizes other equally far-reaching reflections as well. I 
could not in my own person convince myself of the primary nature of 
such a feeling. But I cannot on that account deny that it in fact occurs in 
other people.
 (Freud 1953–74, 21:78)
The humor of the Jewish sensibility provided Freud with powerful 
examples of the depreciation of the superego in popular culture. Low 
Jewish sensibility communicates a critical perspective on superstition, 
venality, and hypocrisy, while expressing solidarity with the cunning 
and pleasure-seeking project of not just the ego, but also the poor, the 
ordinary, and the deprived.
It is striking that Douglas emphasizes Gertrude Stein’s Rabelaisian 
appetites and carnivalesque attitude at the expense of Freud’s somber 
and allegedly stoical pessimism, while Viggo Mortensen’s Freud is 
essentially a humorless and resentful prig. William James and Gertrude 
Stein did not have to work for a living: both enjoyed family fortunes 
that were financially well managed. Henry James Senior was indepen-
dently wealthy: William James was born at Astor House in New York 
City. Gertrude Stein’s father, Daniel, was a railroad executive who 
invested in real estate. Gertrude and her brothers, Daniel and Leo, 
enjoyed lives of bohemian ease because of the wealth and parsimony 
of the family patriarch. The interest income they derived from family 
capital allowed them a disinterested relationship to survival that Freud 
could never entirely enjoy, even though by the 1920s his practice was 
burgeoning and he felt for the first time in his life free from the 
economic anxiety of a paterfamilias with six children, a wife, and 
spinster sisters to support. The 1920s represented a period of global 
economic prosperity, with the United States leading the way in forging 
new forms of consumerism and popular, democratic culture. The stock 
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market soared and the principles of liberal capitalism and social mobility 
seemed ascendant as a rising tide of economic growth and easy credit 
lifted many Americans out of lives of rural deprivation into, if not lives 
of material ease, then at least relative urban cosmopolitanism. In the 
1920s and 1930s, many of Freud’s patients were Americans, like A.A. 
Brill who traveled to Vienna to be treated by him and paid him in US 
dollars, of which he began accumulating a substantial sum (Jones 
1957, 147).
Douglas’ historical linking of Freud, James, and Stein as the theoretical 
enablers of American modernity unites and divides the three figures 
into two groups: elitist and pluralist, with Freud alone in the first cate-
gory, and James and Stein in the second. Freud’s single-minded pursuit 
of unitary theories of psychological life can easily be characterized as 
dogmatic, in contrast to the eclectic, egalitarian ethos represented by 
the Americans in Douglas’ constellation. As I have tried to show in 
greater detail in American Idyll: Academic Anti-Elitism as Cultural Critique 
(Liu 2011), Freud’s thinking embodied the popular skepticism of an 
ordinary person who is capable of exercising reason and critical think-
ing as a matter of instinctual problem-finding and problem-solving. 
Pluralism and eclecticism may seem at first to be more democratic in 
ethos, but in psychoanalytic terms, they also demand a higher degree 
of sublimation and renunciation. While Freud may not have been a 
populist, he abhorred esoteric and mystical spiritual practices, simply 
because gurus and teachers of that sort did not lay out clear paths that 
could be followed by the exercise of reason in their disciples.
In The Case of Sigmund Freud: Medicine and Identity at the Fin de Siècle 
(1993), Sander Gilman affirms the image of a strong-minded and ambi-
tious Freud, enmeshed in arguments about biological determinism and 
the pseudo-science of race and racism that characterized the medical 
establishment of not only the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but of the 
western world itself. Gilman, like most progressive academics writing 
and publishing in the early 1990s, was obsessed with the question of 
identity. For Gilman, Freud was unable to escape the dilemma pre-
sented by the rampant “medicalization of race” in late nineteenth- 
century Europe. He could not avoid contributing to the project of 
biologically defining the difference between Jews and non-Jews and 
yet he fought for psychoanalysis as a new science based on neutrality 
and objectivity in a social and cultural milieu that condemned Jews for 
being emotional and incapable of true reason. While Gilman does not 
go so far as to suggest that Freud in fact embraces an antisemitic 
scientific establishment, he does elaborate a theory of self and bad 
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object that comes very close to defining Freud’s ambiguous relation-
ship to the medical establishment as a neurotic and harrowing one. 
Gilman seems to suggest that in choosing to be a doctor, Freud also 
“chose” to expose himself to more antisemitism than might have been 
his lot had he remained outside the field of professional medical 
ambition: in his words, “Freud elected to be a physician. Yet this choice 
heightened the meaning of his Jewish identity for he could never 
remove himself from the anti-Semitism that clouded his professional 
choice throughout his adult life. Anti-Semitism haunted the medical 
profession” (1993, 217). Freud’s “choice,” thus framed, leads Gilman to 
see the creation of the new science of psychoanalysis as of a piece with 
the Viennese doctor’s “search for identity” (1993, 218). The question of 
identity formation in fin-de-siècle culture contains, according to Gilman, 
potential for extraordinary growth and development: “Freud’s project 
is an example of his positive reaction to the bind of race and science he 
was placed in” (1993, 226). Strong-minded, assertive and positive, 
Freud did not just embody the traits of burgeoning modern America; 
he was obviously understood by Gilman as an exemplary subject, 
someone who made difficult choices, and who could be creative and 
adaptive in response to a complex set of ostensibly insurmountable 
obstacles. Freud was a strong individual whose search for identity 
allowed him to be more innovative and courageous than others around 
him: in choosing difference, difficulty, and complexity over homoge-
neity, ease, and simplicity, Freud arrived at the success of the 
strong-minded.
During the 1990s, many Anglo-American academics found succor in 
the idea of “identity” and the “search for identity”: Sander Gilman’s 
forensic analysis of Freud’s relationship to his Jewish identity partakes 
in the intellectual climate of the time. It is not so remarkable, then, that 
in a book on Freud’s Jewish identity written during this period of 
academic ferment around “identity politics,” Gilman would neglect to 
consider the one text where Freud investigates the founding myths of 
Jewish identity, namely Moses and Monotheism.1 This work by Freud is 
an extraordinary close reading of the Old Testament and an exfoliation 
of the greatest prophet of the Judaic tradition. Moses, Freud argues, 
was an Egyptian: his proof has to do with symptomatic aspects of the 
foundling story that betray the repressed content of Moses’ foreignness 
to the Jews of Egypt. The foundling Moses is adopted by an Egyptian 
princess: he is raised as Egyptian royalty, and only later discovers his 
humble origins. Freud finds this reversal odd: in almost all ancient folk 
tales, the foundling is found by peasants or shepherds, humble people, 
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and it is later revealed that he has royal blood. The fantasy of secret, 
royal origins allows us narcissistic satisfaction. If Moses’ story is a 
secondary revision of the wish-fulfillment of the traditional folk tale, it 
is because the Jewish people have had to repress Moses’ actual origins. 
Moses famously had a speech defect, and this for Freud betrayed his 
discomfort with the language of the Jews. According to Freud’s account, 
which relies on Egyptologist Ernst Sellin’s work, Akhnehaton ascended 
the throne and preached an austere form of monotheism that was 
rejected by the Egyptian elites upon his death. Monotheism, however, 
appealed to some of the most brilliant men in Egypt: according to 
Freud, Moses was one of these men. Upon the death of his pharaoh, he 
chose to leave Egypt with the Jewish people in order to preach and 
institute a monotheism that his chosen people found equally unbear-
able. In the desert, the priesthood murdered Moses, and then the guilt 
of his assassination and the realization of the debt of freedom that was 
owed to him created the elaborate series of prohibitions and proscrip-
tions that the rabbinical elite imposed upon the tribe as collective 
atonement for the murder of the great man: “The Jews, who even 
according to the Bible were stubborn and unruly towards their law-
giver and leader, rebelled at last, killed him, and threw off the imposed 
Aton religion as the Egyptians had done before them” (Freud 1953–74, 
23:156). Freud himself never spoke about identity as an object or 
problem that could be either found or solved: for Freud, identification 
was a process, one that Jacques Lacan would later locate in relation-
ship to mirrors and infantile delusion. When Freud talked about appa-
ratuses and qualities, and about himself in his correspondence with his 
intimates, he was never anything but humorously self-deprecating. 
Freud as “father” of psychoanalysis continued to fascinate American 
thinkers, whether as an entrepreneurial strong man, austere patriarch, 
or conflicted, identity-seeking Jewish doctor.
Self-deprecation and devaluation may have been the emblem of the 
strong man of liberal capitalism, inventor, discoverer, and adventurer. 
It was no accident, however, that the quest for identity and self- 
affirmation became one of the major popular preoccupations of postwar 
America, a country beset by the massive social and economic changes 
described by C. Wright Mills in his classic White Collar: The American 
Middle Classes (2001 [1951]). Mills’ analysis of the gospel of success 
takes off where Ann Douglas leaves off. “Self-help” and “pop therapy” 
would lack “the intellectual and cultural interest that James and Stein 
had brought to the Mind-cure tradition.” By Stein’s death in 1946, “It 
had come to be an unwritten axiom that ‘theory’ and ‘therapy,’ elite 
225
Psychoanalysis, Popular and Unpopular
art and professionalized good cheer, were mutually and forever 
exclusive. Highbrow pessimism assumed low-brow optimism, and vice 
versa” (Douglas 1995, 143). Neither Freud, James, nor Stein was able, 
however, to predict the ways in which popular representations of 
 psychic life would be reshaped and rearranged by postwar self-help 
movements, and the rise of new forms of popular culture and an advice 
industry that married self-hypnosis, self-help, the power of positive 
thinking, and business motivation, for a middle class confronting 
 confusing new forms of work and leisure.
According to Mills, just as the conditions of liberal capitalism were 
being reshaped to suit the massive bureaucracies and corporate 
structures of monopoly capitalism, motivational literature sought to 
reinforce the psychological qualities of an entrepreneurialism that no 
longer suited the professional and economic progress of the salaried 
masses of the American postwar period:
The way up, according to the classic style of liberalism, was to establish a 
small enterprise and to expand it by competition with other enterprises. … 
According to the old entrepreneur’s ideology, success is always linked with 
the sober personal virtues of will power and thrift, habits of order, neat-
ness, and constitutional inability to say Yes to the easy road. These virtues 
are at once a condition and a sign of success. 
(Mills 2001 [1951], 160)
Mills describes the evolution of the inspirational literature of entrepre-
neurial success: first, by bolstering individual resolve in the service of 
the entrepreneurial spirit; second, by justifying the cruelty of failure; 
and third, in the phase of monopoly capitalism and white-collar work, 
by encouraging “peace of mind and various physical and spiritual ways 
of relaxation … by lowering the level of ambition by replacing the 
older goals with more satisfying internal goals. … The literature of the 
peace of the inner man fits in with the alienating process that has 
shifted men from a focus upon production to a focus upon consump-
tion” (2001 [1951], 282–83). If fewer and fewer Americans were 
actually able to persevere as small business owners and self-employed 
entrepreneurs, the literature of success “explained” macro-economic 
changes in terms of individual insufficiency. If your family farm 
or corner grocery store could not survive a period of economic 
consolidation, you were not thrifty enough: you chose the easy road, 
unlike Freud, who allegedly “selected” the medical profession in order 
to present himself before the hostility of institutionalized, pseudo-
scientific antisemitism. On the other hand, if you were unhappy with 
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being passed over for promotion in your white-collar job, you made 
yourself miserable by focusing on the external trappings of success.
Mills’ analysis of the psychology of the mid-century gospel of success 
and inspirational literature served one end: to understand the class iden-
tity of this new American worker. Would he or she be proletarianized, as 
might be expected of wage workers who had no hope of enjoying inher-
ited wealth? Or would he or she hide behind the prestige of educational 
credentials and office work, even if the wages were merely comparable 
or even occasionally inferior to those of blue-collar workers? Will they 
assume political power in solidarity with those below them, or in reac-
tionary consolidation with their economic superiors? His answer is not 
at all clear-cut, but Mills sees the fragmentation and decentralization of 
political power as key in dispersing political authority across a bureaucracy 
or “network” as “manipulation”: in an “impersonalized and more anon-
ymous system of control, explicit responses are not so possible: anxiety 
is likely to replace fear; insecurity to replace worry. The problem is who 
really has power, for often the tangled and hidden system seems a com-
plex yet organized irresponsibility” (2001 [1951], 349).
Although Mills’ Left critique of the growth of technocratically ori-
ented state-sponsored solutions to inequality inspired the student 
movement of the 1960s, his thesis about mass media, popular passivity, 
and “manipulation” fell out favor as a generation of post-’68 academics 
emerged on the cultural studies scene.2 His class-oriented brand of 
qualitative Left sociology had fallen into serious disuse by the 1980s 
and 1990s, two decades that discarded class analysis for split selves, 
performativity, and identity formation. His theories of mass media 
manipulation and popular political indifference fall in line with his 
analysis of monopoly capital’s thinning out of the sphere of political 
action: while unions and corporations seem to monopolize discussions 
about working conditions and two political parties divided the share of 
voters, the white-collar worker retreats or escapes into an inviting 
inner space of self-fashioning. Mills finds in the psychology behind the 
political indifference of the new middle class “the impasse of liberalism 
and the collapse of socialist hopes” (2001 [1951], 326). When a class 
rejects politics altogether, it no longer sees political meaning in its 
“insecurities or desires.” The women’s movement became a place 
where personal experience and political activity would be aligned once 
again, but not in ways that Mills would have recognized.
Although the hipster of the late 1950s would seem to be positioned 
in direct opposition to the rearguardism of Mills’ white-collar workers, 
his stylized estrangement from political meaning and organization was 
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articulated by Norman Mailer’s 1957 essay, “The White Negro,” a hip-
ster declaration of independence from both political participation and 
the talking cure. Whereas, in the 1920s, to be psychoanalytically ori-
ented was to be modern for both white and black bohemians, by the 
end of the 1960s analysts were “squares” and the true social and 
cultural rebel embraced his mental illness as a sanctified and rather 
problematic identification with the everyday danger faced by black 
Americans (Mailer 2007 [1957]). Despite or because of his bombastic 
tone, Mailer presaged the popular repudiation of psychoanalysis as 
both backward and repressive. Moreover, he attributes to the “Negro” 
the unique ability to live completely present to imminent destruction: 
hipster emulation arises not from a bohemian solidarity between white 
and black moderns as described by Douglas in New York City of the 
1920s: Mailer’s white Negro embraced the allegedly transcendent psy-
chopathology of African Americans. While a repudiation of mental 
healing of any sort, “The White Negro” opens with an allusion to the 
unconscious and its unfathomability: “Probably we will never be able 
to determine the psychic havoc of the concentration camps and the 
atom bomb upon the unconscious mind of almost everyone alive in 
these years.”
While psychoanalytic institutes and practices flourished in American 
cities in the 1970s and 1980s, Freud’s science had lost its appeal to 
popular culture. First of all, psychoanalysis was no longer the only 
therapeutic instrument available to middle-class Americans hoping to 
find answers and cures to a spectrum of dilemmas caused by the 
suffering that accompanied mental illness. The counterculture that 
embraced the modern primitive and alternative cures, and non- 
traditional forms of knowledge, found Carl Jung’s theories of anima 
and animus much more congenial to a generational quest for identity 
and alternatives. The search for self would animate social movements 
even as the intellectual arms of such movements grappled with the 
legacy of psychoanalysis, as both theory and therapy.
In the 1970s, psychoanalytic theory found unlikely users among a 
passionate cadre of feminist scholars, especially in the new field of film 
theory and film studies. Freud himself had puzzled over femininity and 
its symptoms: Jacques Lacan would later take the psychoanalytic 
account of castration and lack and remake it as a structural, meaning-
making, but contingent mark of “difference.” Sexual along with class 
difference were two things that feminists wanted to assert in the face 
of homogenizing representations of politics and political participation. 
Marxists like Mills had neglected the gender question: they had 
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neglected the question of sexual difference and in doing so excluded 
forms of political participation and critique made possible by the 
identification of the oppressive powers as “patriarchal.” If the women’s 
movement declared that the “personal was the political,” the objective 
conditions of oppression appeared apprehensible through the 
identification of what was unique and particular to women’s experi-
ences and women’s lives. According to Daniel T. Rodgers’ historical 
account of the early women’s movement, social change was the goal of 
the movement’s focus on raising levels of women’s awareness about 
their identity as women:
Consciousness raising made the personal collective and political. It gave 
the idea of “experience” a powerful place in the 1970s women’s 
movement. … In the process it made solidarities: sisterhood where … 
only fragmented, male-identified, household isolated and family-
absorbed women had existed before. 
(Rodgers 2011, 148)
For feminist activists and scholars, the political significance of 
building feminist coalitions could not have been recognized or imag-
ined by their male counterparts on the Left. A new worldview of 
politics and female experience had to be constructed from the ground 
up. According to Mary Ann Doane, Patricia Mellencamp, and Linda 
Williams, as feminist filmmakers and scholars “began to interrogate the 
assumptions behind a cinematic language of representation which pro-
moted the concept of ‘realism’ and its effects on the construction and 
maintenance of sexual difference along patriarchal lines,” they “began 
to embrace semiotic and psychoanalytic theories that seemed capable 
of accounting for the ways in which patriarchal ideology has elided the 
representation of women” (1984, 7). Although Freud had given us the 
tools by which to understand femininity, he was unable to completely 
account for the generalized cultural misogyny that had rendered femi-
ninity “the underside, the repressed of a classical or rational/conceptual 
discourse … Feminism … allied itself with the avant-garde or with any 
signifying practice which challenged existing discursive structures” 
(Doane, Mellencamp, and Williams 1984, 11).
Feminist filmmakers and activists looked for new ways of working 
and intervening in the art world, in the film industry, and in academia. 
The leading intellectuals of the movement embraced psychoanalytic 
theory as a powerful form of meta-criticism: the use of psychoanalytic 
theory provided tools by which pioneering scholars in feminist film 
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criticism sought to introduce or smuggle new objects and new method-
ologies into the sphere of scholarly study. Psychoanalytic theories pre-
sented themselves as both weapons and targets for a new generation of 
scholars who were bringing their cultural activism into the halls of aca-
demia. The critique of realist film as male fantasy aimed at changing the 
world and freeing women from the straitjacket of gender. Hollywood 
film spectatorship was no more and no less than a form of political 
violence, an Althusserian exercise in ideological assertiveness. No one 
made the case more dramatically than Laura Mulvey in her classic essay 
“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975), in which she uses 
Lacanian and Freudian concepts to dissect the ways in which the cine-
matic objectification of women contributes to the political suppression 
of women: “Woman’s desire is subjected to her image as bearer of the 
bleeding wound. She can only exist in relationship to castration and 
cannot transcend it” (Mulvey 1975, 7). As figures in feminist film criti-
cism like Laura Mulvey, Linda Williams, Tania Modleski, Kaja Silverman, 
and E. Ann Kaplan gained recognition in academia, their work became 
increasingly cited, recognized, and debated, but the goal of securing 
social change seemed to recede even as professional success and recog-
nition seemed more achievable. Feminists were remarkably successful 
at organizing conferences and film festivals, and editing anthologies 
and journals in which new ideas about sexual difference and the politics 
of exclusion and exploitation were highlighted and criticized. In the 
passionate debates inspired by feminist film theory, fantasy, fetishism, 
and visual pleasure alternated between censure and celebration. The 
concepts themselves were as divorced from the practice of psychoanal-
ysis as they were from the formulation of policy and political struggle in 
legislative bodies. In these familiar and tortured controversies over 
women’s images, male gazes, and imaginary penises, a.k.a. phalluses, 
we see feminist film scholars using a selective language of psychoana-
lytic theory to present possibilities for reading, interpreting, and mak-
ing film in order to remake the world itself. Christine Gledhill’s 1976 
essay, “Developments in Feminist Film Criticism,” illustrates the prob-
lems that feminist film theorists confronted in their use of psychoana-
lytic concepts as ideology critique. At the beginning of her essay she 
writes, “there is a danger that, once the object of feminist criticism is 
defined solely in terms of the cinematic production of meaning, we lose 
the ability to deal with its relationship to women as defined in other 
social practices” (Gledhill 1984 [1976], 19). Gledhill’s political and 
intellectual ambition encompasses no less than an “assault” on patri-
archy using the critical tools of the avant-garde, anti-realism, Lacanian 
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psychoanalysis, the work of Roland Barthes, and the integration of a 
feminist-infused form of Marxism to contest the ideologies of capitalism. 
It is undeniable that the 1970s were a time of political optimism for the 
Left, with the civil upheavals of the 1960s still fresh in everyone’s 
memory, but Gledhill realizes as she approaches the end of her over-
view that something has been lost in the theoretical elaboration of post-
structural psycholinguistic subject positions. “Real” women’s lives, as 
defined by social practices, seemed to recede further and further from 
critical and cognitive analysis. The way out? Pointing to academic study 
of Harlequin romances, television, and newspaper advice columns as 
“unofficial discourses” by which women negotiate their relationships 
with dominant culture. It was during this period that poststructuralist 
theory became more insular and more elaborate, even as its engage-
ments with popular cultural forms became more strident.
Psychoanalytic theory was instrumentalized as a facilitating but 
limited critique of patriarchy that returns the intellectual, boomerang-
like, back to more study and more analysis of the repressed and the 
marginal, all in an airless world of dominant and marginalized dis-
courses desperately seeking social relations in the form of real people 
and their experiences of spectatorship. Feminist film theory’s accom-
plishments were many, but its mobilization of psychoanalytic theory 
for the purposes of cultural criticism became increasingly academic. In 
the meantime, on November 29, 1993, Time Magazine’s cover featured 
a digitally rendered portrait of Freud’s head dissolving into little puzzle 
pieces with the headline, “Is Freud Dead?” Along with self-help and 
New Age cures, behavioral and psychopharmacological therapies had 
increasingly replaced the Freudian cure in the practice of psychiatry 
with allegedly more effective and economical treatments. Freud’s own 
“strength of mind” now appeared more as a symptom of his dogmatism 
and rigidity.
The famous white-collar middle class described by Mills had been 
thoroughly traumatized by wave after wave of corporate downsizing. 
Freelance work was the dignified way of understanding professional 
unemployment as self-employment. Blue-collar workers saw their 
unions decimated, their jobs transferred overseas. At the same time, 
1970s feminists were disturbed by the younger generation of women’s 
traditional choices. Even as middle-class women made their way up 
the meritocratic ladder, the middle class in general suffered economic 
setback after economic setback. The 1990s was the decade of the New 
Economy entrepreneur and the hacker. The rise of the Internet facili-
tated the study of the moving image, but undermined the importance 
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of traditional Hollywood realist narratives; younger people had less 
and less experience with the realist narratives attacked by feminists 
and poststructuralists. The personal computer interfaced with increas-
ingly miniaturized and mobile screens, and the on-line identities with 
which we accessed these spaces seemed a priori discursive, fragmented, 
transgressive, and unpredictable. Psychoanalysis was no longer a novelty 
or a scapegoat, at least in the popular imagination: almost everyone 
knows that sometimes “a cigar is just a cigar.” A certain kind of psycho-
analytic theory continues to thrive almost exclusively as an academic 
discourse, the history of its reception obscured by antagonisms real or 
imaginary with the culture that surrounded it. It is not surprising that 
today an obdurate but familiar indifference greets Freud’s and  feminism’s 
insights regarding sexual difference and the unconscious.
Notes
1 Jan Assman’s Moses, the Egyptian (1997) and Yosef Yerushalmi’s Freud’s 
Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable (1991) represent two different, 
sustained scholarly investigations of Freud’s theory of the origins of 
monotheism.
2 See, for example, Andrew Ross’ No Respect (1989) and Henry Jenkins’ 
Convergence Culture (2006).
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